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PAC CONTRIBUTIONS AND EFFECTIVE CORPORATE TAX
RATES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
by
JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a great deal of concern has been expressed that many cor-
porations have not been paying their "fair share" of federal taxes. Especially
troublesome is the fact that some profitable large corporations have been able
to avoid paying corporate income taxes altogether. For example, according to
a recent study by Citizens for Tax Justice, Boeing, ITT, General Dynamics,
Transamerica, First Executive Corp., Mitchell Energy & Development, Grey-
hound, Grumman, and Lockheed successfully zeroed-out their respective income
tax liabilities or received tax rebates in every year from 1981 through 1984.1
It is commonly asserted that such large corporations have used political
influence to secure special tax benefits to reduce their respective tax liabilities.
The present study investigates whether, in fact, there is a relationship between
corporate political influence and corporate tax liabilities. Specifically, this study
examines the relationship between corporate political action committee (PAC)
contributions made during the 1983-1984 election cycle and the effective cor-
porate tax rates imposed on the related corporations in 1985.
BACKGROUND
Under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended,2 labor
unions, corporations, trade associations, and certain professional and member-
ship organizations may establish and finance "connected" political commit-
tees to support candidates for federal office.3 In recent years, such political action
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; B.A. 1973, Northwestern University; M.A.
(Psychology) 1975, University of Iowa; J.D. 1978, University of Michigan; M.A. (Economics) 1983, George
Washington University. The author wishes to thank Professor Arthur D. Cassill of the University of North
Carolina at Greensboro and University of Oklahoma graduate student Lani Lee Malysa for reviewing an
earlier draft. The author also wishes to thank Federal Election Commission Supervisory Statistician Robert
Biersack and University of Oklahoma graduate student Bob Schull for their technical assistance.
I See R.S. McIntyre & D. Wilhelm, Citizens for Tax Justice, Corporate Taxpayers & Corporate Freeloaders:
Four Years of Continuing, Legalized Tax Avoidance by America's Largest Corporations 1981-1984, at 3
(1985)[hereinafter cited as Citizens for Tax Justice].
22 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq (Supp. 1987). The principal federal election campaign laws resulted from the
following Acts: Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (1971); Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971); Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974); Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976); and Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. Law.
No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1979).
3 Such committees are allowed to solicit voluntary contributions from persons related to their sponsors.
The PACs, themselves, may then contribute as much as $5,000 for each primary or general election to
a candidate for federal elective office. There is no overall limitation on the amount that a PAC can con-
tribute to all candidates. PACs and candidates for federal office are required to file periodic reports with
the Federal Election Commission.
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committees or PACs have made extensive contributions to congressional can-
didates. For example, during the 1985-1986 election cycle, some 3,152 PACs
contributed over $125 million to Senate and House candidates seeking election
in 1986, up from just over $100 million contributed to candidates seeking
Congressional seats in 1984.4
Members of the Senate and House tax-writing committees have been
especially favored by PAC contributors. For example, in 1985, Senator Bob
Packwood (R-Ore.), then-Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, received
the most PAC contributions of any member of Congress - $965,517. Similarly,
in 1987, Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.), the current Chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, received the most PAC contributions - $1.4 million.6
According to Common Cause President Fred Wertheimer, the explanation for
such large PAC contributions to members of the tax-writing committees is that
"PAC money is being given by special interest groups in order to assure that
they get special advantages in our tax system." 7
Recent academic literature also suggests that PAC contributions are made
in order to secure special benefits For example, the theory of economic regula-
tion postulates that special interest groups act as wealth-maximizers who seek
to influence the regulatory environment in order to secure special economic
benefits. Accordingly, the theory predicts that special interest groups, such as
PACs, will make campaign contributions in order to secure special economic
benefits through favorable legislative outcomes? With respect to tax legisla-
tion, special interests are expected to make campaign contributions to political
413(8) Federal Election Commission Record 6-8 (August 1987).
'Common Cause News release, "Gimme a Break" 2-3 (February 11, 1986).
646(9) Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 488 (Feb. 27, 1988).
'Common Cause news release, supra note 5, at 1.
8 Consider e.g., R.E. McCormick & R.D. Tollison, Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy: An In-
quiry into the Interest Group Theory of Government (1981); G.C. Jacobson & S. Kernell, Strategy and
Choice in Congressional Elections (1981); Peltzman, Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting, 27
J. Law & Econ. 181 (1984); and Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Management
Sci. 335 (1974). See also H.E. Alexander, Financing Politics: Money, Elections, and Political Reform (3d
ed. 1984); Drew, A Reporter At Large: Politics and Money, 58 New Yorker 54 (December 6, 1982), 57
(December 13, 1982); Mayton, Politics, Money, Coercion, and the Problem with Corporate Pacs, 29 Emory
L.J. 375 (1980).
9 A number of recent empirical studies have found support for this proposition. See e.g., A. Cassill, The
Influence of Pac Contributions upon Industry Income Tax Burdens: An Empirical Analysis (unpublished
manuscript 1987); Eismeier & Pollock, Politics and Markets: Corporate Money in American National
Elections, 16 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 287 (1986); Eismeier & Pollack, Strategy and Choice in Congressional
Elections: The Role of Political Action Committees, 30 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 197 (1986); Esty & Caves, Market
Structure and Political Influence: New Data on Political Expenditures, Activities, and Success, 21 Econ.
Inquiry 24 (1983); Jacobson, Party Organization and Distribution of Campaign Resources: Republicans
and Democrats in 1982, 100 Pol. Sci. Q. 603 (1985); Jacobson, Money and Votes Reconsidered: Congres-
sional Elections, 1972-1982, 47 Pub. Choice 7 (1985); Salamon & Siegfried, Economic Power and Political
Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy, 71 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1026 (1977); and Wright,
PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective, 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 400 (1985).
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candidates in order to secure special tax benefits.10
Clearly, Congress has included a variety of special tax exclusions, deduc-
tions, credits, and other preferences in the Internal Revenue Code to benefit
certain companies and certain industries. For example, the oil industry benefits
from provisions that allow percentage depletion and expensing of intangible
drilling costs, and the computer industry has benefited from the research and
experimentation credit. By taking advantage of these special tax provisions,
corporations can reduce the amount of corporate income tax that they pay. The
concern is that some of these special tax benefits may be the result of inor-
dinate political influence by special interest groups, rather than the result of
good governmental policy planning for the general interest.
One overall measure of the extent to which a given corporation receives
special benefits in the federal tax system is that corporation's effective tax rate."
A corporation's effective tax rate is generally much lower than the maximum
statutory rate. For example, while the 1985 statutory tax rate on income in ex-
cess of $100,000 was 46%, according to a recent Tax Analysts study of the ef-
fective corporate tax rates imposed on 1,000 of the largest U.S. corporations
in 1985, the average effective corporate tax rate imposed on those corporations
was just 20.91% 12 Other studies have found similar low average effective cor-
porate tax rates.13
Most studies of effective corporate tax rates have found that effective cor-
10 A number of authors have expressed this concern. See e.g., J.H. Birnbaum & A.S. Murray, Showdown
at Gucci Gulch (1987); Common Cause, Gimme a Break (1985); Common Cause, Financing the Finance
Committee (1986); J.F. Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax (1985); A. Cassill,
supra note 9; Doemberg & McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform,
71 Minn. L. Rev. 913 (1987); Reuben, Tax and PACs: Drawing the Connection, 29 Tax Notes 1335 (1985);
and Timberlake, Revelation of Members' Breakfast Clubs Renews Controversy Over PACs' Influence, 34
Tax Notes 541 (1987). With respect to the role of special interests in the tax legislative process generally,
see e.g., Graetz, Reflections on the Tax Legislative Process: Prelude to Reform, 58 Va. L. Rev. 1389 (1972);
Hoffman, The Role of the Bar in the Tax Legislative Process, 37 Tax L. Rev. 411 (1982); Surrey, The Con-
gress and the Tax Lobbyist - How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1957);
and Waggonner, Aspects of Legislative Persuasion: Business, 32 Nat'l Tax J. 290 (1979).
1 Generally, an effective corporate tax rate is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total tax paid by
the corporation and the denominator of which is some measure of the corporation's pretax income.
1
2 FD. Marovelli & S.D. O'Donnell (Tax Analysts), Effective Corporate Tax Rates 1985, at 17
(1986)[hereinafter cited as Tax Analysts].
3 See e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income - 1982, Corporate Income Tax Returns (1985);
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Study of 1983 Effective Tax Rates of Selected
Large U.S. Corporations (Comm. Print 1984); Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., Study of 1982 Effective Tax Rates of Selected Large U.S. Corporations (Comm. Print 1983); Citizens
for Tax Justice, supra note 1; ED. Marovelli (Tax Analysts), Effective Corporate Tax Rates 1980-1984
(1986); M.L. Starcher (Tax Analysts), Quantifying the Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on Effective
Corporate Tax Rates (1986).
For additional discussions of the methodology involved in the determination of effective corporate
tax rates, see Bradford & Stuart, Issues in the Measurement and Interpretation of Effective Tax Rates,
39 Nat'l Tax J. 307 (1986); Fullerton, The Use of Effective Tax Rates in Tax Policy, 39 Nat'l Tax J. 285
(1986); Fullerton, Which Effective Tax Rate? 37 Nat'l Tax J. 23 (1984); and Spooner, Effective Tax Rates
from Financial Statements, 39 Nat'l Tax J. 293 (1986).
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porate tax rates vary dramatically from company to company and even from
year to year for the same company. Some of the variation can perhaps be ex-
plained by the fact that corporations in certain industries generally seem to
have lower effective corporate tax rates than corporations in other industries.
For exmaple, in the Tax Analysts study of 1985 effective corporate tax rates,
the average effective tax rate for corporations in the mining industry was just
8.13 %, while the average effective tax rate for corporations in the apparel in-
dustry was 40.47 % .14 Other studies suggest that some of the variation in effec-
tive corporate tax rates results from differences in corporate capital structures
and investment patterns."
Another possibility is that some of that wide variation in effective cor-
porate tax rates can be explained by the theory of economic regulation; that
is, lower effective corporate tax rates may be related to greater campaign con-
tributions made by the connected corporate PACs. Indeed, the results of one
recent study indicate that corporate PAC contributions do have an effect on
industry average effective tax rates.' 6 The present study explores the relation-
ship between corporate PAC contributions and effective tax rates of the connected
specific corporations.
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
Hypotheses
Academic theories of economic regulation suggest that corporate PACs make
political contributions in order to secure additional tax benefits for their con-
nected corporations. Receipt of these additional tax benefits should be reflected
in relatively lower tax rates for those connected corporations. Accordingly, if
corporate PAC contributions do, in fact, secure corporate tax benefits, then one
would expect that corporations with PACs making extensive campaign contribu-
tions will have relatively lower effective tax rates than corporations making
minimal or no campaign contributions. Several empirically testable research
hypotheses follow from this last proposition.
14 See Tax Analysts, supra note 12, at 15-16.
15 See e.g., Siegfried, Effective Average U.S. Corporation Income Tax Rates, 27 Nat'l Tax J. (1974); Weiss,
Effective Corporation Income Tax Rates, 32 Nat'l Tax J. 380 (1979); and Zimmerman, Taxes and Firm
Size, 5 J. Acct. & Econ. 119 (1983).
16A. Cassill, supra note 9. Cassill used Federal Election Commission Non-Party Report on Financial Ac-
tivity tapes (1977-1982), and the Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income - 1982, Corporate Income
Tax Returns (1985) to investigate the influence of corporate PAC contributions to members of the tax-writing
committees on industry income tax burdens. His results did indicate that corporate PAC contributions
were somewhat related to industry average effective corporate tax rates. Specifically, after controlling for
varying levels of income, average effective corporate tax rates were found to be lower for industries mak-
ing higher levels of PAC contributions relative to industries making lower PAC contributions.
[Vol. 5
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First, one would expect that corporations with PACs generally will have
lower effective corporate tax rates than corporations without PACs. Second,
of those corporations with PACs, one would expect that those corporations whose
PACs make more campaign contributions in one time period will have lower
effective tax rates in subsequent periods than those corporations whose PACs
make less contributions. In this regard, one might expect that contributions
to members of the tax-writing committees would be particularly effective in
securing tax benefits and consequently lower effective tax rates. Finally, one
would expect that PACs connected to corporations with higher incomes will
generally contribute more to candidates than PACs connected to corporations
with lower incomes.17
Data and Variables
To test these hypotheses, this study examined the relationship between cam-
paign contributions made by corporate PACs during the 1983-1984 election cycle
and the effective corporate tax rates of the connected corporations in 1985.18
The'data set used in this analysis was developed from the Tax Analysts study
of the effective tax rates imposed on 1,000 of the largest U.S. corporations in
198519 and from 1983-1984 Federal Election Commission (FEC) records.
Two variables from the Tax Analysts study were used in this analysis.
The dependent variable is Tax Analysts' estimate of the corporation's effective
U.S. tax rate on U.S. income (USRATE).2 ° As one of the independent variables,
Tax Analysts' estimate of the corporation's pretax U.S. income (USINCOME)
was selected.
Two additional independent variables were developed from the FEC
17 There are two reasons for this hypothesis. First, corporations with higher incomes are generally larger
corporations. These corporations should generally have larger PACs because they have more potential
employee and shareholder PAC contributors. Second, PACs connected to corporations with higher incomes
can be expected to contribute more since these corporations would have relatively greater tax savings from
securing lower effective tax rates.
18 As a study of the influence of corporations on tax legislation, this study is admittedly limited in several
ways. First, this study does not take into account any lobbying efforts of large corporations other than
PAC contributions. In this regard, some corporations without PACs may receive special benefits by direct-
ly lobbying members of Congress and so have no need for PACs. Second, the present study does not con-
sider PAC contributions by industry PACs. These organizations, such as the American Bankers Associa-
tion BANKPAC and the National Association of Independent Insurers PAC, have contributed thousands
of dollars to members of Congress on behalf of their industries. In this regard, some corporations without
PACs may receive special tax benefits as a consequence of industry and trade PAC contributions and so
have no need for their own PACs.
Finally, this study simply does not consider the aggregate effect of corporate and industry PAC con-
tributions on federal revenues raised by the corporate sector as a whole, yet it is quite plausible that the
net effect of corporate PAC contributions by large corporations has been to reduce the effective tax rate
for all corporations or, at least, to minimize the share of federal revenues raised by the corporate sector
as a whole. In this regard, from 1950 to 1983 corporate taxes declined from 26.5% of total federal receipts
to just 6.2% of total federal receipts. See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Study of 1983 Effective Tax Rates of Selected Large U.S. Corporations, supra note 13, at 19.
19 See Tax Analysts, supra note 12.
20 USRATE is a fraction, the numerator of which is the corporation's U.S. income tax paid and the
denominator of which is the corporation's USINCOME. See Tax Analysts, supra note 12, at 3-6. For some
1988]
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1983-1984 Non-Party Report on Financial Activity computer tape?' First, a deter-
mination was made as to which of the corporations in the Tax Analysts study
had one or more connected PACs during the 1983-1984 election cycle 2 Then
for those corporations with connected PACs, the total PAC contributions made
by each corporation's connected PACs to all House and Senate candidates dur-
ing 1983-1984 (CONTALL) and the total PAC contributions made by each cor-
poration's connected PACs to all members of the Senate Finance and House
Ways and Means Committees (CONTTAX) were determined.
Statistical Analyses
Fortune Corporations
Initially, the author considered just the 1985 Fortune 500 largest U.S. in-
dustrial corporations2 3 Of these, Tax Analysts had computed USINCOME and
USRATE for just 358. The overall mean effective U.S. tax rate on U.S. income
(USRATE) for these 358 corporations was 25.01%, with a standard deviation
of 30.53%.
Of the 358 corporations, 201 had connected PACs and 157 did not. The
mean USRATE for the 201 corporations with PACs was 23.27 %, and the mean
USRATE for the 157 corporations without PACs was 27.24%. Although the
difference between the means was in the expected direction, a t-test comparing
of the corporations, the USRATE is negative. For example, a corporation with positive USINCOME would
have a negative USRATE if its activities generated tax loss carryforwards. Id. In some cases, Tax Analysts
did not determine a U.S. rate, typically because the U.S. operations incurred a loss. Id. at 316, n.18.
21 The tape contains two files which detail transactions which occurred between every federal candidate
and every non-party political action committee during the 1983-1984 election cycle. The "spread" file
contains 4,347 records - one record for each non-party committee. The records are arranged on the tape
first by the type organization which sponsors the committee, with committees sponsored by corporations
appearing first alphabetically by committee name. Each record also includes, inter alia, the committee's
FEC identification number, special-interest-group classification (e.g., C = Corporate, and indicates that
the committee is connected with a corporation) and extensive information about receipts, contributions,
and disbursements made by the committee during the election cycle. The "crosstabs" file contains 106,705
records - one record for each reported candidate-committee combination. The records are sorted in the
same manner as the "spread" file. Each record includes, inter alia, a committee's FEC identification number,
a candidate's name and FEC identification number, and information about that committee's contributions
to that candidate.
22 PAC connections for the Tax Analyst corporations were identified primarily by comparing a list of the
remaining Tax Analyst corporations with a printout of the FEC 1983-1984 Committee Cross Index and
with a printout of the "spread" file of the FEC 1983-1984 Non-Party Report on Financial Activity tape.
PACs of affiliated corporations were included in the study as if they were directly connected to the parent
corporation.
23113(9) Fortune 174-232 (April 28, 1986).
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the two means was not statistically significant 2 4
Tax Analysts Corporations with PACs
Next, the author considered a somewhat larger sample of corporations with
PACs for more detailed analysis. Starting with the 1,000 corporations in the
Tax Analysts study, those without PACs were excluded. Of those with PACs,
the Tax Analysts study had determined USINCOME and USRATE for just 456
corporations. The mean USRATE for these 456 corporations was 20.38 %, with
a standard deviation of 25.89%.
Pearson correlation coefficients were then computed to see the relationship
among the variables USINCOME, CONTALL, CONTTAX, and USRATE 25
and these coefficients are displayed in Table 1.26 Neither CONTALL nor
CONTTAX was significantly correlated with USRATE, although the relation-
ships were in the expected direction. Also, USRATE was not significantly
correlated with USINCOME. USINCOME was, however, significantly
correlated with both CONTALL and CONTTAX, and CONTALL was sig-
nificantly correlated with CONTTAX.
As an alternative way to investigate the relationship between PAC contribu-
tions to candidates for congressional office and effective corporate tax rates,
a multiple regression of CONTALL and USINCOME on USRATE was then
run. The results of that regression are set forth in Table 2.27 Again, although
the relationship between CONTALL and USRATE was in the expected direc-
tion, it was not significant. Also, there was no significant relationship between
USINCOME and USRATE.
24 Assuming equal variances for the two populations, with 356 degrees of freedom, t = -1.222. The prob-
ability of a t value greater than that absolute t was 22.26%.
25 Because of missing data values on the FEC tape, CONTALL could not be determined for one company
and CONTTAX could not be determined for a different company. Accordingly, most of the statistical tests
utilized just 455 observations.
26 TABLE 1. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AND PROBABILITIES*
USINCOME CONTALL CONTTAX USRATE
USINCOME 1.000 0.531* 0.443* 0.005
CONTALL 1.000 0.776* -0.036
CONTTAX 1.000 -0.069
USRATE 1.000
*Correlations were found to be significant at the .01 level.
27 TABLE 2. MULTIPLE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (Proability Value in Parentheses)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = USRATE
R2  0.0021
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:
INTERCEPT 20.64
USINCOME 0.000000002
(0.552)
CONTALL -0.0000209366
(0.334)
1988]
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Finally, to see if there was a relationship between PAC contributions to
members of the tax-writing committees and effective corporate tax rates, a
separate multiple regression of CONTTAX and USINCOME on USRATE was
run.28 The results of that regression are set forth in Table 3.29 Again, although
the relationship between CONTTAX and USRATE was in the expected direc-
tion, it was not significant, nor was USINCOME significantly related to
USRATE.
DISCUSSION
Somewhat surprisingly, the results failed to show any significant relation-
ship between corporate PAC contributions and the effective tax rates paid by
the connected corporations. First, corporations that had PACs during the
1983-1984 election cycle did not have significantly lower 1985 effective cor-
porate tax rates than corporations without PACs. Second, considering only those
corporations with PACs, relatively greater PAC contributions did not significantly
relate to relatively lower tax rates. While counter-intuitive, these findings are
reassuring in that they suggest that, at least as among the sample corporations,
greater corporate PAC contributions to members of Congress did not secure
greater tax benefits.
The results also failed to show a significant relationship between the sample
corporations' 1985 U.S. income and their 1985 effective corporate tax rates.
Since a corporation's U.S. income is closely related to its size, this result can
be interpreted to mean that, all other things being equal, larger corporations
and smaller corporations in the sample faced roughly the same effective tax
rate. This interpretation is also somewhat reassuring in that it suggests that sheer
economic power alone (i.e., size) does not result in disproportionately greater
tax benefits.
Finally, the results did show that 1983-1984 corporate PAC contributions
were significantly related to 1985 corporate income. Also, corporate PAC con-
tributions to all congressional candidates were significantly related to corporate
PAC contributions to members of the tax-writing committees. Since a corpora-
tion's U.S. income is closely related to its size and number of possible employee-
contributors, these relationships probably indicate nothing more than the obvious:
28 Because of the relatively high correlation between CONTALL and CONTTAX, the separate multiple
regressions were run to avoid the problem of multicollinearity.
29 TABLE 3. MULTIPLE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (Proability Value in Parentheses)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = USRATE
R2  0.0064
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:
INTERCEPT 20.94
USINCOME 0.000000003
(0.390)
CONTTAX -0.0003069204
(0.091)
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PACs connected to larger corporations are likely to contribute more to
congressional candidates, generally, and to tax-writers, in particular, than PACs
connected to smaller corporations.
CONCLUSION
Although the results of this study failed to show any significant relation-
ship between corporate PAC contributions and the effective corporate tax rates
paid by the connected corporations, further research may be warranted. It may
be worthwhile to examine the relationship between corporate PAC contribu-
tions and effective corporate tax rates over more election cycles and more tax
years. In particular, it will be interesting to see whether there is any relation-
ship between the extensive corporate PAC contributions made during the
1985-1986 election cycle and the relative effective corporate tax rates of the
connected corporations for 1988 when the full effects of the high-stakes Tax
Reform Act of 1986 can be measured.
9
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